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 Changing Beliefs and Systematic Rational Forecast Errors
 with Evidence from Foreign Exchange
 By KAREN K. LEWIS*
 Recent evidence concerning dollar forecasts during the early 1980s have led to
 assertions that the market was irrational. This paper investigates an alternative
 interpretation. Following the tightening of the U.S. money market, agents did not
 immediately believe that the change would persist, but instead learned the shift
 rationally. Empirical simulations indicate that the model appears consistent with
 about half of the dollar's underprediction implied by the forward market during
 the period.
 According to the "Rational Expectations"
 paradigm, the market uses efficiently all
 available information in forming forecasts of
 future variables. Assuming also that the mar-
 ket knows the underlying distribution of eco-
 nomic disturbances, this paradigm implies
 that forecast errors are uncorrelated with the
 information set used to form the forecasts.
 Under this additional assumption, the para-
 digm of rational expectations, used exten-
 sively throughout macroeconomics, has come
 to be associated with the presumption that
 forecast errors have mean zero.
 Recent empirical evidence from the behav-
 ior of one macroeconomic variable, the ex-
 change rate, has suggested a potential con-
 tradiction to this implication of rational
 expectations. For example, on the basis of
 survey data Jeffrey Frankel and Ken Froot
 (1987) find that market participants system-
 atically underpredicted the strength of the
 dollar during the early 1980s. Furthermore,
 the prediction of the forward dollar ex-
 change rate implied a weaker dollar than
 was realized on-average from the period from
 1980 through 1985.' Therefore, some inter-
 pret the overall evidence of systematic dollar
 forecast errors as evidence of market irra-
 tionality.
 By contrast, this paper investigates a dif-
 ferent source of systematic forecast errors,
 where agents in fact use all available infor-
 mation efficiently and in this sense are ratio-
 nal. In general, the paper analyzes the fore-
 cast error effects due to a change in the
 process of fundamentals that the market
 learns only over time using Bayesian updat-
 ing.2 In particular, this framework is used to
 empirically investigate the implied impact
 upon dollar forecast errors due to learning
 about the increase in U.S. money demand in
 *NBER and New York University, Graduate School
 of Business, 90 Trinity Place, Rm. 1303, New York, NY
 10006. I am grateful for useful comments from two
 anonymous referees, Jim Boughton, Robert Cumby, Ken
 Froot, Linda Goldberg, David Gordon, Dale Hender-
 son, Richard Levich, Jim Lothian, Nelson Mark, Paul
 Wachtel, and seminar participants at MIT, the Univer-
 sity of Pennsylvania, the Federal Reserve Board of
 Governors, Georgetown University, Virginia Polytech-
 nic Institute, Ohio State University, and New York
 University. I am also indebted to Hali Edison for pro-
 viding the money supply and price data. Any errors are
 mine alone.
 'Richard Levich (1985) shows that these "excess
 returns" on dollar assets were statistically significant
 and ranged from a monthly rate of 0.6 percent for the
 Japanese yen to 1.4 percent for the Swiss franc during
 this period. Although a risk premium against the dollar
 could theoretically explain this behavior, the period of
 largest excess returns began in 1981, at a time when the
 market analysts referred to the dollar buying by foreign-
 ers as "a flight to quality" and as a "safe haven." See
 Robert Cumby (1988).
 2This behavior is similar to the systematic surprises
 to the Phillips curve and, hence, employment as an
 economy converges to equilibrium, as described in John
 Taylor (1975). In a related issue, Robert Flood and
 Peter Garber (1980) and Marianne Baxter (1985) study
 agents' beliefs about the credibility of government re-
 forms using Bayesian methods.
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 the early 1980s. Using conservative values
 for the range of plausible parameter values,
 this learning model implies systematic un-
 der-prediction of the dollar's strength by
 about one-half the levels suggested by the
 forward exchange rate.
 This paper focuses upon the shift in U.S.
 money demand for three reasons. First, at
 the time of this shift the Federal Reserve
 used a non-borrowed reserves target for
 monetary policy, a procedure that does not
 allow changes in money demand to be fully
 accommodated. Second, since the increase in
 money demand appeared to surprise the
 Federal Reserve as well as the private sector,
 it seems plausible to suppose that the in-
 crease in money demand was not fully antic-
 ipated. Third, unlike more model-specific ex-
 change rate determinants, money demand
 affects the exchange rate in the same manner
 for a wide class of models.
 In the paper, the exchange rate effects
 from learning about higher money demand
 are calculated based upon two polar assump-
 tions about the market's knowledge of the
 new money demand equation. First, in the
 event that the money demand equation has
 changed, the market knows the parameters
 of the new equation. Second, the market
 learns the parameters of the new equation
 only over time.
 The paper is organized as follows. Section
 I describes the behavior of systematic fore-
 cast errors for a general forward-looking as-
 set price when the market learns about a
 change in a fundamentals process. Section II
 relates this analysis to the dollar exchange
 rate due to an increase in the process of U.S.
 money demand when the market knows the
 parameters of the new process. Section III
 investigates the effects upon the forecast er-
 rors when the market does not know the new
 parameters, but only learns them over time.
 Concluding remarks follow in Section IV.
 I. Systematic Forecast Errors
 and Evolving Beliefs
 The following simple example demon-
 strates how forecast errors may be systemati-
 cally incorrect while the market rationally
 learns the true process that generates funda-
 mentals. This example represents in general
 the behavior of prices that have forward-
 looking solutions, such as stock prices (Ro-
 bert Shiller, 1981) or hyperinflation (Tom
 Sargent and Neil Wallace, 1973). Despite its
 general representation, this variable will be
 called the "exchange rate" since the analysis
 will be applied to the U.S. dollar exchange
 rate in the following section.
 To motivate the behavior of forecast er-
 rors, suppose the exchange rate is deter-
 mined by a set of fundamental variables that
 influence the demand for and supply of cur-
 rency at each point in time and by the
 expected future exchange rate.3 In particu-
 lar, s,, the logarithm of the exchange rate, is
 given by the following simple equation:
 (1) s,= n,-z, + aE,(s,+1-s,),
 where E,(*) is the conditional expectations
 operator and where z, and n, are "funda-
 mentals" variables that determine the ex-
 change rate with coefficients that have been
 arbitrarily set equal to 1 and -1, respec-
 tively. While the distribution of n, is as-
 sumed stationary and ergodic throughout,
 the process for z, may switch from one pro-
 cess to another (as discussed below). To fo-
 cus upon the market's beliefs about this
 switch, z, and n, are assumed uncorrelated.
 Solving equation (1) forward gives the solu-
 tion of the exchange rate in terms of future
 expected " fundamentals":
 (2) s, =(1/(1 + a))
 00
 X E? (a/l(l + a))jE,(n,+j- z,+j)
 j=o
 _ - (1/(1 + a))
 00
 x : (a/(l + a))jE,(z,+j)
 ]=o
 where
 rNk (1/(1 + a))'O o( a/(l + la))i
 x Er(nk+j)'
 3See Jacob Frenkel and Michael Mussa (1980), for
 example.
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 Since the n t are stationary, they have a
 time-series representation with white-noise
 i.i.d. innovations.
 Before describing the effects of revising
 beliefs about the distribution of zt, consider
 first the exchange rate forecast errors under
 the standard assumption that the market
 knows with certainty the process followed by
 the fundamentals. Furthermore, assume that
 the zt process is stationary after first-dif-
 ferencing and is given by,
 (3) A zt=6 o+vo,t
 where A is the difference operator, So is a
 constant parameter, and vo, t is a white-noise,
 normally distributed disturbance term. Tak-
 ing the expectations of future values of zt
 and nt and substituting the result into equa-
 tion (2) gives the following exchange rate
 solution:
 (4) St =- vo, t- (I + al)So -zt - 1 + tNt.
 Taking the conditional expectation operator
 across equation (4) gives the mean zero i.i.d.
 forecast errors:
 (5 ) St -Et -1st =V0, t + ( tNt- - t_Nj )
 Now suppose that at a point in time, T,
 market participants believe that the process
 of zt may have changed due to an event or
 announcement exogenous to the process of
 fundamentals. Suppose further that if the
 process in equation (3) in fact changed at
 time T, the market knows that this new
 process will follow,
 (3 ) AZt an + Vn, tv for t 2 T,
 where an > So and where Vn, t is a white-noise,
 normally distributed random variable. In
 general, the increase in 8 represents a switch
 in the fundamentals process that strengthens
 the exchange rate.
 Over time, the market would discover the
 true process, parameterized either by So if
 there is no change, or by A,n if it changed to
 the new process. To characterize this learn-
 ing process, market participants are assumed
 to form Bayesian forecasts, assigning a prob-
 ability weight to either process. The market's
 uncertainty about the process followed by zt
 will affect the exchange rate as in equation
 (2) by altering the present and future expec-
 tations of zt, That is, the expected future
 values of this fundamental variable are prob-
 ability-weighted averages of the two pro-
 cesses in equations (3) and (3'), respectively.
 Specifically, defining P. as the probability
 that the process generating zt has the param-
 eter Si, for t> T,
 (6) Et_j(Azt_j+,_)
 =P., t - l8 + Pn, t- lsnv > ?
 =( Po, t- 18o + Pn, t- an )
 + (Po t-16 t-1 + Pn,t-lVn,t-1) AZt-1,
 j=0,
 where Po, t + Pn, t = 1 and where vQ, t = Azt-
 Sj, the market's estimate of the current dis-
 turbance given that j is the process. Clearly,
 since the v1. are white noise, the expected
 future value of the fundamental variable is a
 simple probability-weighted average of the
 two 8 parameters. The market decomposes
 the current observation of Azt into two com-
 ponents implied by each process.
 Substituting the expected future funda-
 mentals in equation (6) into the exchange
 rate solution in equation (2), implies the
 following form:
 (7) st = [Po' tV , t + Pn, vnt
 -(1 + a)(PO, to + Pn, tn)
 -Zt- 1+ tNt.
 Furthermore, subtracting from equation (7)
 the exchange rate forecast conditional upon
 t - 1 information gives the market's forecast
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 error based upon their updated beliefs about
 the process of z.
 (8) (s,-Et ,l (s,tPj,i_-))
 [Po0,o, ?t + Pn t n, t
 + (I + a)(Sn -o)(Pn,t Pn,t-1)]
 + (tN ,N-_ 1Nj
 t=-e,Vn ,+(tNt - t-Nt),
 where e,Po t ( Vn, t - VO, ) + (1 + a)(Sn -
 o) A n e, ? e2 ,. Since the ,N, terms
 have mean zero and are uncorrelated with
 z,, any systematic behavior in the forecast
 errors must arise from the component that
 depends upon z,. Hence, without any loss of
 generality, the forecast errors, ,N,-,_ lN,,
 will be set equal to zero for the remainder of
 the paper.
 To investigate the behavior of the compo-
 nent due to changing beliefs about the shift-
 ing fundamental process requires further
 specifying how the market updates beliefs
 about the process. At the initial point in
 time T, market participants assign a proba-
 bility, Pn,T to the event that 6 switched
 from So to Sn. Thereafter, they update this
 probability based upon subsequent observa-
 tions according to Bayes' law. Thus,
 (9)
 [ P,,,,-kf(AZ-t- AZ^ t-kI8n.)+ Po.,-kf(AZ-ts- AZ ,--AI8Ao)
 where f(Az,18j) is the density function of
 LAz, given Si and where P -k are the prior
 probabilities at some lag k. Clearly, the mar-
 ket's beliefs about the process move over
 time in response to realizations of the ran-
 dom variable z. Asymptotically, the proba-
 bility assigned to the new process, Pn, con-
 verges either to one, if in fact the process has
 changed, or to zero if no change has taken
 place.4 That is, if the true parameter of the
 process generating z, is 8i, then plim Pi, = 1.
 Even though the forecasts minimize the
 market's errors conditional upon their prior
 beliefs, the expected value of the market's
 Bayesian forecast errors based upon this true
 distribution of zt will not in general be zero
 during the period while market participants
 are learning. For example, suppose that in
 fact the process of zt changed to the "new"
 process given by an at time T. Then, from
 equation (8), any nonzero expectation of the
 forecast errors based upon this true distribu-
 tion depends only upon the expected value
 of e,, since: E( V, tIn) = E(vnt) = 0. There-
 fore, based upon the true process for zt, a
 sample mean of the exchange rate forecast
 errors conditional upon the beliefs embodied
 in P1, can be written as decomposed into
 el,t and e2, t.
 (10)
 E (I/T) [L? - (sE-1(St,IPj t-)] Ian}
 E {(IIT)[1,eljT n}
 t = T
 - E{(IIT)[ e2jTI6n}
 (-[ t -T? }
 = E ( ( 1/4 (PO, t( v^O t Vn,t) I an)
 -(1 a)E (1/T) L [(3,7 a-o)}
 X (Pnt Pn,t-l)]6n }
 where the expectation, E{ *1,, }, is based
 upon the true process, and where the mar-
 ket's conditional forecasts, Et_,(stPjP t- )
 are based upon the t -1 information set of
 (z,, nt) and upon learning about the pro-
 cesses up until time t -1, as embodied in the
 conditional probabilities.
 From equation (10), we can clearly see
 that the expected value of a sample mean of
 4The result is straightforward and is discussed in
 Karen Lewis (1988a).
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 forecast errors based upon realizations of zt
 from the true distribution, 8, is negative. If
 the process has in fact changed, then the first
 component i3 v, which has mean zero.
 However, the estimate of the disturbance
 from the "Old" process based upon realiza-
 tions from the "New" process is on-average
 positive since it is given by:
 (11) A ' = AZt -_
 =( an + vn, t) -S
 for 8 =n
 Intuitively, during the learning period, too
 much of the larger observed fundamental
 variable is associated with transitory noise
 relative to a permanent change. Thus, the
 first component of forecast errors given by
 PO (vo t - v, t) will be positive for an aver-
 age sequence of drawings from the true dis-
 tribution. As P0Ot goes to zero, this compo-
 nent converges to zero as well.
 The second source of on-average mis-pre-
 diction arises from the expected permanent
 growth rate of the fundamental. Because the
 market does not initially believe with cer-
 tainty that the process has changed, P,nr < 1.
 Therefore, as Pn, rises during the learning
 period, the sum of the change in probabili-
 ties, Pn, -P, t-, is positive in expectation.
 Intuitively, while learning the market does
 not yet fully believe that the process is an
 and therefore underestimates on-average the
 fundamental's permanent growth rate. For
 this reason, the expected value of the second
 component, -(1 + a)(ao, - t
 based upon the true an is negative during the
 learning period.
 Since the market's average mis-prediction
 disappears as P., goes to zero, it might seem
 that faster learning will always imply less
 mis-prediction on-average. This intuition is
 misleading, however. Within any small sam-
 ple, the speed of convergence in the proba-
 bilities affects the two components of the
 "bias" in equation (10) in opposite direc-
 tions. For example, very slow downward
 movement in P increases the bias due to
 the transitory component, el ,, but because
 changes in P,,, are smaller, it also reduces
 the bias due to the permanent component,
 e2 t; and vice versa for relatively fast proba-
 bility convergence. Both of these cases ap-
 pear in the results examined below.
 II. Empirical Evidence Using U.S. Money
 Demand
 As described in the introduction, survey
 data and forward exchange rates suggest that
 the market was systematically surprised by
 the strength of the U.S. dollar during the
 early 1980s, in apparent contradiction to the
 premise of rational expectations. However,
 the preceding discussion demonstrated that
 on-average systematic forecast errors could
 arise from rational behavior if the market
 were learning about a shift in the process of
 fundamentals. Relating this theoretical dis-
 cussion to the foreign exchange market re-
 quires identifying relevant exchange rate
 "fundamentals."
 Motivations for the appropriate funda-
 mentals variables that influence the ex-
 change rate range from trade balance effects
 (Peter Hooper and John Morton, 1982) to
 fiscal policy (Martin Feldstein, 1986) to in-
 ternational price adjustment (Michael Mu-ssa,
 1982), Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Ro-
 goff, 1984), to name only a few. While these
 fundamental effects may be important, learn-
 ing behavior applied to a particular one of
 these fundamentals would be model-specific.
 On the other hand, money market equilib-
 rium is a required condition common to
 many different exchange rate models and
 therefore is the focus of this section.
 A. The U.S. Money Market
 in the Early 1980s
 Beginning in 1981, money balances sub-
 stantially exceeded most projections based
 upon money demand equations then in use
 by various sources including the Federal Re-
 serve, leading some to call the episode the
 "Great Velocity Decline" (for example, Fed-
 eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1983).
 Indeed, despite a fairly stable and positive
 annual growth rate for MI velocity of about
 3.4 percent from 1947 to 1981, the rate of
 velocity growth was negative from the fall of
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 1981 through 1986. Also, in terms of money
 demand itself, a number of studies have
 identified a positive shift in U.S. money de-
 mand around the fall of 1981.5
 If fully accommodated by an increase in
 the money supply, this shift in money de-
 mand growth would not affect the exchange
 rate. However, there are two main reasons to
 believe that the increase in money demand
 was not immediately offset by increased
 money supply. First, at the time of the shift,
 the Federal Reserve was conducting mone-
 tary policy using a non-borrowed reserves
 target, an operating procedure that does not
 fully accommodate changes in money de-
 mand. The increased growth rate in mone-
 tary aggregates following the apparent in-
 crease in money demand eventually helped
 induce the Federal Reserve to abandon the
 non-borrowed reserves target in the summer
 to autumn of 1982. The operating procedure
 was officially replaced with a borrowed re-
 serves target in early 1983 together with a
 more judgmental approach to targeting that
 has again implied partial, but not complete,
 monetary accommodation.6
 The second main reason for incomplete
 monetary accommodation is that the Federal
 Reserve appeared to use money demand pro-
 jections to set non-borrowed reserves targets
 at FOMC meetings for the six- to eight-week
 inter-meeting period (see, for example, David
 Lindsey, 1981). Hence, even an overt deci-
 sion to accommodate the increased money
 demand as a matter of discretionary policy
 would have required enough observations for
 the Fed to adjust its projections used in
 forming policy. Furthermore, such an overt
 decision seems unlikely since long-term tar-
 gets were apparently taken seriously and
 readjusted only infrequently (Richard Davis,
 1981).
 Thus, given the nature of operating proce-
 dures and the policymaking process by the
 Federal Reserve during the early 1980s, an
 increase in money demand would probably
 have taken time to accommodate. An in-
 crease in money demand without a commen-
 surate increase in money supply would have
 induced an appreciation of the U.S. dollar.
 For this reason, the following analysis will
 treat the increase in money demand as a
 source of shift in fundamentals. However,
 offsetting increases in the money supply
 could in theory mitigate the implied appreci-
 ation of the dollar due to the increased
 money demand. Because of this possibility,
 parameter values that minimize the impact
 of exchange rate mis-predictions will be em-
 phasized in the calculations of learning ef-
 fects below.
 B. Forecast Errors and a Shift
 in Domestic Money Demand
 To investigate empirically the market's as-
 sessed probabilities of the new money mar-
 ket process as specified in equation (9), we
 need a money demand equation that is parsi-
 monious. We require parsimony since a sin-
 gle update of the probabilities necessitates
 enough independent observations of the fun-
 damentals process to identify the model. That
 is, if k is the number of parameters in the
 money demand equation, the probabilities
 can be revised only every k periods. For this
 reason, the following form of the money
 demand equation was used in the analysis.
 (12) Am,-Ap,=S1j-9Ai +vJt,
 j = 0, n,
 where m and p are the logarithms of domes-
 5Reasons posited for this shift range from the dra-
 matic decline in inflation, to a portfolio switch out of
 bonds due to the increased volatility in interest rates, to
 a combination of effects from financial innovation in
 conjunction with the decline in inflation. On the behav-
 ior of velocity, see Robert Heller (1988). On the behav-
 ior of different money demand equations see, for in-
 stance, Yoshihisa Baba, David Hendry, and Ross Starr
 (1988), Andrew Rose (1985), and the references therein.
 6See Robert Heller (1988) for a description of how
 non-borrowed reserves targeting implies only partial
 accommodation. As he demonstrates, total reserves have
 fluctuated more under the recent borrowed reserves
 targeting procedure than under the period of non-bor-
 rowed reserves targeting, but interest rates have also
 fluctuated more than under the period of Fed funds
 targeting in the 1970s, again suggesting partial accom-
 modation. Partial accommodation of the shifts in veloc-
 ity during the early 1980s has been argued by Olivier
 Blanchard (1984) and Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer
 (1983), among others.
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 tic money and the price level, respectively, it
 is the level of the domestic interest rate, 8 is
 a constant term, 9 is the interest semi-elas-
 ticity of money demand, and v is a normally
 distributed i.i.d. disturbance term. Two as-
 sumptions are embodied in equation (12) for
 the sake of parsimony. First, the income
 elasticity is constrained to zero, although
 probability estimates based upon setting the
 income elasticity at other levels did not sub-
 stantially alter the results.7 Second, the dis-
 turbance to the money demand equation in
 level terms is assumed to contain a unit root,
 with a white-noise innovation after first-
 differencing. This specification is consistent
 with the form of money demand assumed in
 empirical specifications of the monetary
 model of exchange rate determination such
 as Richard Meese (1986) and Kenneth West
 (1987).
 In this form, U.S. money demand may be
 viewed as the fundamental variable repre-
 sented by z, in equation (1).8 In other words,9
 (13) A ztAm, - Apt- Xit
 = bj + Vj, ,f
 j = o, n .
 When 8 increases to Sn > 830, unless the mar-
 ket participants immediately recognize this
 change, they on-average underestimate the
 strength of the domestic currency while they
 learn that z, follows the new process.
 To verify the shift in money demand found
 in other studies, the constancy of the param-
 eters in the money demand equation (12)
 was tested. The monthly money and price
 data are from Richard Meese (1986), cover-
 ing the period from January 1973 to June
 1984 and are MI and CPI data, respectively.
 The interest rates are from Morgan Guar-
 anty's World Financial Markets. Indeed, us-
 ing a Wald test, the constancy of 8 before
 and after October 1981 was rejected at a
 marginal significance level of 0.02 percent,
 consistent with the shift found using other
 forms of money demand.
 C. Constructing the Forecast Errors
 Given this shift in money demand, we
 might ask how predictions about the dollar
 would have been affected if the market were
 learning about the change. One way to gauge
 the impact of learning upon the exchange
 rate is to consider the implied effects based
 upon some extreme assumptions about the
 learning process. Therefore, this section cal-
 culates effects from learning under one ex-
 treme assumption: the market knows the
 parameters of the new distribution; while the
 next section assumes the other extreme: the
 market has no information about the new
 distribution. Presumably, the "true" case is
 bounded between these two extremes.
 Calculating the effects of learning on the
 ex post average mis-prediction described by
 the variable e, requires three sets of vari-
 ables. The first set of variables, 6 and vi,
 are estimated from the data using the money
 demand equation (12). The second set, vari-
 able a, corresponds to the characteristic root
 of the full exchange rate model and will be
 discussed in more detail below. The third set
 of variables are the probabilities, Pi,,, that
 determine the evolution and convergence of
 the dollar's systematic mis-prediction. As de-
 scribed in equation (9), these probabilities
 depend upon a prior probability. Rather than
 specifying an ad hoc prior probability, how-
 7The income elasticities investigated were 0.4 and
 0.3, values Richard Meese (1986) reports unrejected by
 a monetary model of the dollar.
 8This money demand is assumed to be the market
 aggregate of a very large number of atomistic agents.
 Although individual agents have information about their
 own money demand, they view their contribution as
 having no effect upon the aggregate. Therefore, they
 learn about aggregate money demand by observing the
 market.
 Notice also that focusing upon U.S. money demand
 alone treats foreign money demand as one of the "other
 fundamentals" in N,. However, since monetary models
 typically depend upon the difference between domestic
 and foreign money demand, the following learning anal-
 ysis was also applied to the United States minus Ger-
 man and United States minus British money demand
 functions. As reported in Karen Lewis (1988b), the
 implied forecast errors using relative money demand are
 similar to those using U.S. money demand alone.
 In standard monetary models of the exchange rate
 such as Michael Mussa (1976), the characteristic root of
 the exchange rate solution is generally a function of the
 interest semi-elasticity, 9. For this reason, the interest
 rate response of money demand does not enter directly
 as fundamentals.
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 ever, we can provide an estimate of this
 initial probability by assuming that the mar-
 ket has essentially learned the new process
 by some reasonable endpoint. At this point,
 we can specify a terminal "new" probability
 close to one. Then we can "back out" the
 probabilities by taking the posterior odds of
 equation (9) and moving these odds back-
 ward through time according to:
 (14) (:)Pn t-k Pn, f(AZ1 ,..., AZIt-kso)
 |Po.t-k Po, if (A Z1 9t 'A Zt-kl8n)
 Since f( ) is the money demand equation
 (12), the minimum number of observations
 the market requires in order to identify the
 process equals the number of parameters
 (i.e., 8, 0, a,), so that k = 3.
 Since the econometrician typically has less
 information available than the market has,
 we may benchmark the latest feasible termi-
 nal period by noting endpoints of sample
 periods used by academic studies that note
 the apparent money demand change. By this
 criterion, an outer bound for learning con-
 vergence of July 1984 was chosen.10 Al-
 though the first set of probabilities will be
 backed out from this point, the probabilities
 are recursive functions only of the likelihood
 ratios so that choosing a probability at any
 point in time and iterating equation (9) for-
 ward and backward determines a unique path
 of probabilities.11
 In addition to choosing an initial proba-
 bility, calculating the probabilities requires
 forming the likelihood ratio of the two money
 demand distributions for each observation.
 The parameters of the "old" distribution,
 denoted 80, was estimated using data during
 the floating rate period from July 1973
 through September 1981. Similarly, the
 "new" distribution, denoted AS was esti-
 mated from October 1981 through June 1984.
 For the analysis presented below, the distur-
 bance variance, oa, was assumed the same
 over the two processes although allowing for
 different variances did not appreciably alter
 the results. Karen Lewis (1988b) details the
 construction of these probability estimates.
 D. Empirical Evidence: Evolving Beliefs
 About U.S. Money Demand
 Table 1 presents the evolution of the prob-
 abilities for the new higher U.S. money de-
 mand equation given that the probabilities
 have almost converged by mid-1984 with
 two assumed final probabilities of the old
 process: 0.1 percent and 1 percent. The
 probabilities were then "backed out" to the
 end of 1981, as described in equation (14).
 The columns with headings Pn describe the
 behavior of the "new" probability over time.
 During much of 1982, the market does not
 yet have enough information to assess
 whether the money demand equation has
 changed to An. But over time, the market
 begins to recognize that money demand is
 governed by the new equation so that the
 probabilities of the new process converge.
 The results in the table also indicate that
 backing out the probabilities implies very
 small initial probabilities of less than 1 per-
 cent, estimates that may seem reasonable
 since the change appeared largely unantici-
 pated. However, since the recursive probabil-
 ities depend only upon the likelihood ratio,
 we can also consider the effects of larger
 initial probabilities from the Table 1 results.
 The table clearly indicates that higher initial
 probabilities of Pn would imply even larger
 final probabilities of the new distribution
 than 0.999. By contrast, the learning model
 in the following section indicates a wider
 feasible range of initial probabilities.
 The evolution of this probability affects
 the behavior of et, the degree of ex post
 "bias" in forecast errors during the fall of
 1981 through mid-1984.12 This behavior de-
 10For example, Baba, Hendry, and Starr (1987) use a
 data set ending in the second quarter of 1984 to help
 explain the "great velocity decline" with a money de-
 mand specification.
 11Therefore, readers who may believe that the market
 learned about the change in money demand after July
 1984 would choose a relatively large terminal value of
 P. However, terminal values greater than about 1 per-
 cent imply almost implausibly small initial probabilities
 for the new process, as will be shown below. In addi-
 tion, the learning analysis begins in October 1981 since
 before this time, the probabilities in equation (14) would
 fall on-average.
 12 Recently, Charles Engel and James Hamilton
 (1988) and Graciela Kaminsky (1988) have estimated
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 pends upon the size of the increase in money
 demand, given by S. and A,, at the top of the
 table. In addition, calculating e2, , the per-
 manent component, requires a value of a. In
 general, this parameter determines the char-
 acteristic root of the exchange rate equation
 and therefore depends upon the full ex-
 change rate model, potentially including the
 dynamics of the omitted variables, N,." To
 understand the impact of a, observe from
 equation (10) that the absolute value of the
 "bias" due to the permanent money demand
 component depends positively upon a. As
 equation (2) shows, larger values of a imply
 that future expectations have a stronger ef-
 fect upon the current exchange rate and,
 therefore, larger effects upon exchange rate
 forecast errors.
 Since larger values of a bias the learning
 effects upward, Table 1 reports values of the
 ex post bias terms for two "lower-bound"
 values of a discussed in Behzad Diba (1987).
 He explains why some exchange rate studies
 that assume a lower-bound level of a = 0.8
 choose a range of a that is too low since
 they do not adjust for the difference between
 annual and monthly data. He suggests that
 instead a=100, but also finds that lower-
 bound estimates of 14 give implied exchange
 rate variances at least as large as actual
 exchange rate variances. To allow compari-
 son with this literature, Table 1 reports re-
 sults assuming these two lower-bound esti-
 mates: a = 0.8 and 14.
 Several issues concerning the behavior of
 these forecast errors in Table 1 deserve em-
 phasizing. First, as described in Section I,
 the size of the ex post, apparent bias disap-
 pears over time as the probability converges.
 For example, the effects of the disturbance
 term component, P0(vo - v"), reaches a peak
 in September 1982 and generally declines
 thereafter, dissipating to small levels by the
 end of the sample. Second, the probabilities
 are random variables, evident from the vari-
 ability in the component under the columns
 marked "e2, ,." Third, as demonstrated at the
 bottom of the table, the mean of the forecast
 errors implied by changing beliefs about U.S.
 money demand are about 0.7 when a= 14
 but decline to between 0.4 to 0.5 when a =
 0.8. Overall, these lower values correspond
 to roughly a half of the systematic under-
 prediction of the dollar based upon the for-
 ward markets in the German DM and the
 British pound.'4
 Since e, is a random variable, this learning
 process also implies greater variability in
 forecast errors. Although one might suppose
 that testing whether the variability of et is
 significantly related to the variability in the
 exchange rate would comprise a test of the
 model, two factors preclude such an inter-
 pretation. First, the learning process is inher-
 ently a small sample problem and therefore
 asymptotic properties do not apply. The sec-
 ond and less obvious reason arises because
 by construction et is a variable that closely
 converges within the sample to its asymp-
 totic distribution of zero (with no variance).
 Since a covariance with any nonrandom con-
 stant is zero, measures of the covariance
 between the mis-prediction term, e, and the
 exchange rate will be biased toward zero. We
 might nevertheless inspect these covariances
 for different parameter values as a general
 indication of the behavior of the model. As
 Table 1 reports, the covariances between the
 forward prediction errors and the implied
 errors are positive in all 4 cases-for the two
 different terminal probabilities and for the
 range of a.'5
 time-series processes of the exchange rate that parame-
 terize two different regimes of appreciation and depreci-
 ation, respectively. A challenge for future research will
 be to understand the combination of changes in funda-
 mentals behind these switches in exchange rate regimes.
 The period under study above falls within one of their
 dollar appreciation regimes of roughly March 1981 to
 February 1985 and therefore makes a contribution to-
 ward relating this "regime" to a change in a fundamen-
 tal equilibrium condition.
 13For example, Richard Meese and Kenneth Single-
 ton (1983) solve for exchange rate variance bounds
 relationships using general monetary models as well as
 the two-good model of Michael Mussa (1982), in which
 the roots of the exchange rate solution depend upon the
 dynamic behavior of prices.
 14The exchange rates are from the IMF's "Interna-
 tional Statistics Monthly" while the forward rates are
 constructed from the interest rate data assuming cov-
 ered-interest parity.
 1 Although positive covariances were also found for
 other terminal probabilities, by using different values
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 TABLE 1-IMPLIED EXCHANGE RATE FORECAST ERRORS USING LOWER-BOUND ESTIMATES OF a
 EVOLUTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE PROBABILITIES AND THE FORECAST ERRORS
 Ex Post Forecast Bias: el,, + e -
 s= -0.303, =0.362
 Final Probability
 of Old Process 0.001 0.010
 PN el, e2, PN elt e2,
 a=0.8 a=14 a=0.8 ax=14
 Month
 82 :01 0.000 0.96 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.96 0.000 0.000
 82:02 0.002 0.54 0.002 0.018 0.000 0.55 0.000 0.002
 82:03 0.000 0.56 - 0.002 - 0.017 0.000 0.56 - 0.002 - 0.002
 82:04 0.000 0.68 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.68 0.000 0.000
 82:05 0.002 0.64 0.002 0.018 0.000 0.64 0.000 0.002
 82:06 0.000 0.67 - 0.002 - 0.016 0.000 0.67 - 0.000 - 0.002
 82:07 0.000 0.72 - 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 0.72 - 0.000 - 0.000
 82:08 0.005 0.53 0.007 0.054 0.000 0.53 0.000 0.005
 82:09 0.009 0.92 0.004 0.033 0.001 0.93 0.000 0.003
 82:10 0.000 0.86 -0.010 -0.085 0.000 0.86 -0.001 - 0.008
 82:11 0.036 0.59 0.042 0.353 0.004 0.61 0.004 0.036
 82:12 0.079 0.73 0.052 0.433 0.008 0.79 0.006 0.048
 83:01 0.026 0.65 - 0.063 - 0.528 0.003 0.66 - 0.007 - 0.058
 83:02 0.550 0.29 0.628 5.231 0.108 0.58 0.126 1.053
 83: 03 0.506 0.35 - 0.053 - 0.442 0.092 0.64 - 0.019 - 0.160
 83:04 0.112 0.59 - 0.472 - 3.932 0.012 0.66 - 0.096 - 0.797
 83 :05 0.437 0.33 0.389 3.239 0.071 0.54 0.071 0.588
 83:06 0.319 0.50 - 0.141 - 1.175 0.044 0.70 - 0.032 - 0.269
 83:07 0.732 0.18 0.495 4.121 0.213 0.52 0.202 1.682
 83 :08 0.966 0.02 0.281 2.338 0.739 0.16 0.630 5.251
 83 :09 0.978 0.01 0.014 0.120 0.817 0.12 0.093 0.776
 83:10 0.843 0.11 -0.161 -1.346 0.348 0.44 -0.561 - 4.679
 83:11 0.979 0.01 0.163 1.356 0.824 0.12 0.570 4.748
 83:12 0.989 0.01 0.012 0.098 0.900 0.07 0.091 0.755
 84:01 0.979 0.01 -0.012 -0.097 0.824 0.11 -0.090 -0.753
 84:02 0.994 0.00 0.018 0.149 0.945 0.04 0.144 1.204
 84:03 0.996 0.00 0.002 0.016 0.959 0.03 0.017 0.144
 84:04 0.993 0.01 - 0.004 - 0.032 0.930 0.04 - 0.034 - 0.287
 84:05 0.990 0.01 - 0.003 -0.023 0.911 0.06 -0.024 - 0.197
 84:06 0.992 0.01 0.002 0.013 0.922 0.05 0.014 0.116
 Forward Prediction Error Means: German DM =-0.95 British Pound = - 1.08
 Forward Prediction Error Variances: German DM = 8.05 British Pound = 6.56
 Implied Errors: Mean Variance Covariance w/Forward Error
 German DM British Pound
 a =14/Final Po of 0.001 -0.71 2.57 0.27 0.14
 a = 14/Final Po of 0.010 - 0.77 2.50 0.40 0.06
 a = 0.8/Final Po of 0.001 - 0.42 0.12 0.04 0.04
 a = 0.8/Final P0 of 0.010 -0.50 0.10 0.07 0.01
 a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 Notes: aThe forecast error estimates use U.S. MI money supply, CPI, and industrial production data described in Richard
 Meese and Kenneth Rogoff (1984). Interest rates are from Morgan Guaranty's World Financial Markets, while exchange rates
 are from the IMF's International Statistics Monthly. Probability estimates are based upon normal conjugate prior distribu-
 tions with 8, -0.303, 8, = 0.362, Precision parameters: 2 = 4.84, q = 135.
 Larger values of a than assumed in Table
 1 will clearly imply greater average exchange
 rate mis-prediction over the period. There-
 fore, a useful criterion for determining the
 range of a consistent with the model is to
 ask: for what value of a would learning
 explain all of the observed under-predic-
 tion? Table 2 reports the forecast error series
 calculated by choosing critical levels of a
 for the probabilities to generate forecast errors it was
 possible to generate negative covariances in some cases.
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 TABLE 2-IMPLIED EXCHANGE RATE FORECAST ERRORS USING BREAK-EVEN VALUES FOR a
 EVOLUTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE FORECAST ERRORS
 Ex Post Forecast Bias: .95 = e, = el, + e2,1 = Po (', - vo)+(1 + a) A P, (8, - )
 o= -0. 303, 8,, = 0.362
 Implied Forecast Errors
 Final Probability
 of Old Processa 0.001 0.010
 Critical a 25.81 23.61
 Total Permanent Total Permanent
 Error Component Error Component
 et e2,, et e2,
 Month
 82:01 0.959 0.000 0.959 0.000
 82:02 0.574 0.030 0.548 0.003
 82:03 0.527 - 0.030 0.554 - 0.003
 82:04 0.678 0.000 0.678 0.000
 82 :05 0.672 0.031 0.645 0.003
 82:06 0.637 - 0.028 0.663 -0.003
 82:07 0.717 -0.002 0.719 - 0.000
 82:08 0.624 0.093 0.542 0.008
 82:09 0.976 0.057 0.932 0.005
 82:10 0.712 -0.146 0.845 -0.013
 82:11 1.198 0.607 0.667 0.057
 82:12 1.476 0.745 0.863 0.075
 83:01 - 0.260 -0.908 0.573 - 0.091
 83:02 9.295 9.001 2.241 1.658
 83:03 -0.411 -0.760 0.391 -0.251
 83:04 - 6.177 - 6.767 -0.598 -1.254
 83:05 5.900 5.573 1.465 0.926
 83:06 - 1.525 - 2.022 0.273 -0.424
 83 :07 7.268 7.091 3.167 2.648
 83:08 4.044 4.024 8.425 8.266
 83:09 0.221 0.207 1.339 1.221
 83:10 - 2.211 - 2.316 - 6.929 - 7.365
 83:11 2.347 2.333 7.595 7.475
 83:12 0.176 0.168 1.257 1.189
 84:01 - 0.154 - 0.168 - 1.069 - 1.185
 84:02 0.260 0.257 1.930 1.189
 84:03 0.030 0.027 0.256 0.227
 84:04 - 0.050 - 0.054 - 0.407 - 0.452
 84:05 - 0.033 - 0.039 - 0.255 - 0.309
 84:06 0.029 0.023 0.233 0.183
 Forward Prediction Error Means: German DM = -0.95 British Pound = -1.08
 Forward Prediction Error Variances: German DM = 8.05 British Pound = 6.56
 Covariance w/Forward Error
 Implied Errors: Meanb Variance German DM British Pound
 Final P0 of 0.001 - 0.95 7.70 0.46 0).23
 Final P0 of 0.010 -0.95 6.30 0.62 0.10
 Notes: aThe data used and the evolution of the probabilities are the sanme as in Table 1.
 bBv construction.
 that set the sample average of the implied
 forecast error series equal to the sample av-
 erage forward prediction error of the dollar-
 deutsche mark exchange rate, 0.95. Since the
 evidence in Jeffrey Frankel and Ken Froot
 (1987) indicate that forecast errors based
 upon survey data were generally larger than
 the forward prediction errors, this estimate
 of the prediction error might even be con-
 sidered relatively small. The critical values
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 implied by forcing the model to explain all
 of the ex post bias in forecasting are 25.81
 and 23.61. As the table shows, both forecast
 error series have more variability and are
 positively correlated with forward prediction
 errors in all cases.
 Overall, the results in this section indicate
 that a relatively wide range of a yield a
 range of the under-prediction of the dollar's
 strength from about one-half to all of the
 forward market's under-prediction during the
 period from 1981 to 1984. Within the sam-
 ple, the ex post bias due to the permanent
 component of money demand, e2f,, tended
 to be somewhat large since the probabilities
 converged rather quickly. This relatively fast
 convergence of the probabilities depended in
 part upon the underlying assumption that
 the market knew the parameters of the new
 and old distributions.
 111. Evolving Beliefs While Learning
 the Process Parameters
 By contrast with the previous discussion,
 this section investigates the effects upon dol-
 lar exchange rate forecast errors assuming
 the market did not know the new distribu-
 tion of money demand but instead learned
 its parameters over time."6 In this version,
 the market learns the distribution by updat-
 ing for each observation of zt its priors of
 the "old" and " new" parameter distribu-
 tions, So and 3n' respectively. Defining as Si,t
 the parameter estimate formed from the pos-
 terior distribution under process i, the ex-
 change rate equation (7) requires the follow-
 ing modifications:
 (7 ) s, Po' t-o , + Pn tv ,U t]
 (1 + a)[Po'tso,t + Pn, n,t
 -Zt-1 +tNt-
 Since market participants initially have no
 information about S., they use a diffuse prior
 for its distribution at T. Using subsequent
 observations of zt, they update this prior
 distribution providing new estimates of 8n, t.
 On the other hand, they base their prior
 distribution of the old process, SO, at T upon
 the past history Of zt and use observations
 following T to update this prior.'7
 Taking forecast errors conditional upon
 the two prior distributions, parameterized by
 8. and upon the prior probabilities parame-
 terized by P implies,
 (8 ) (s - Et 1s.lat- Pi -)
 A A
 Vn.t 0 XtVO, t n ,t) ( + )
 X [ (Po, t8o, t Po' t- 180, t- 1 )
 + Pn,t An, tPn, t -1An, t - I
 A
 =-Vn t-1,t-2, t
 where now vn, t Az, tSn,t and in, t=Po.t
 x ( A t - VA, t). Thus, even though the forecast
 errors are more complicated under parame-
 ter learning, the basic results from the sim-
 pler model continue to apply. As before, if
 the process in fact changed at T, the distur-
 bances based upon the "new" distribution,
 Vn have expectation zero since the expected
value of 8n, t is 8n the true mean of the
 posterior distribution.18 Also as before, the
 expected value of the disturbance based upon
 the "old" process, vA , is positive.'9 There-
 fore, while market participants are learning
 about the new process, they ascribe too much
 of the money demand observation to transi-
 tory noise by the weight placed upon the old
 process, Po t. Finally as before, the second
 component in (8'), j2 ,, arises from under-
 16 Examples of papers that study the effects of learn-
 ing about the market parameters include Roman Fryd-
 man (1982), Margaret Bray and N. E. Savin (1986), and
 Albert Marcet and Tom Sargent (1986) for selfrefer-
 ential learning.
 17See Lewis (1989) for a discussion of the evolution
 of both of these distributions.
 '8See Arnold Zellner (1971), pp. 224-33.
 19To see this result, note that the disturbance term
 conditional upon 83, is: v3 = Az, - 30, = 3n + v"', -
 8., ,.I Since initially 8. T < 8,, for small samples, t,, has
 positive expectation based upon the true distribution,
 8P1.
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 predicting the permanent growth rate of
 money demand during learning. The expec-
 tation of e27t based upon the true distribu-
 tion is positive because as Pn, is increasing,
 the estimates of 6, are rising faster than
 80, t.
 The forecast errors in equation (8) were
 calculated based upon initial prior probabili-
 ties and distributions for 8 in October 1981.
 The prior distribution for the "old" process
 was estimated from equation (12) using data
 during the floating rate period since 1973,
 while the initial "new" prior was diffuse.
 Since the market initially has no information
 about the new distribution, the market learns
 much more slowly than when the parameters
 are known. For this reason, backing out the
 probabilities as in equation (14) implied im-
 plausibly large initial probabilities of a
 change in money demand.20 Given this evi-
 dence, we may proceed to consider the ef-
 fects upon the forecast errors based upon a
 range of initial probabilities as presented in
 Table 3. The top of the table reports some
 summary statistics on the behavior of the
 parameter estimates under the "Old" and
 "New" beliefs about the money demand
 process. First, the average parameter esti-
 mates for So and 6,, were -0.16 and 0.21,
 respectively. Although the parameter esti-
 mates evolve over time, the average value of
 8 is less than the average value of a,
 since the market weights observations before
 1981 in the estimate of money demand in
 forming So ,. Also, as the summary evidence
 demonstrates, the variance of the parameter
 based upon believing a change has occurred,
 8? is much larger than the "no-change"
 parameter estimates, Oet-
 To gauge the sensitivity of the implied
 forecast errors to initial probabilities, Table
 3 reports summary statistics of probabilities
 and implied forecast errors for two very dif-
 ferent initial probabilities of a "New" pro-
 cess: (1) Pn T = 50 percent indicating a mar-
 ket that thought a change to a new process
 was equally likely as no change, and (2)
 PI'= 1 percent indicating a market with low
 initial beliefs of a change. The table reports
 the results of the lower-bound case where
 a= 0.8, although the bottom of the table
 contains summary statistics assuming a =14
 as well. The probability of a change gener-
 ally rises over time although neither proba-
 bility process converges to one within the
 sample. Since the probabilities converge
 much more slowly in this case, the perma-
 nent component, J2 t, exhibits less mis-pre-
 diction. However, as the summary statistics
 indicate, both series imply negative average
 forecast errors consistent with the lower-
 bound range found in the previous tables.
 Furthermore, the variability is larger than
 before since the market now learns about the
 parameter estimates in addition to detecting
 the process change.
 The table also reports the results using
 critical levels of a that set the implied error
 means equal to the dollar-DM forward error
 mean of 0.95. The critical values of a com-
 prise a rather wide range from 12.23 to 84.83
 for initial "new" probabilities of 0.5 and
 0.01, respectively. The initial probability of
 0.5 implies excessively large variances, how-
 ever, indicating that, if the market were
 learning in this manner, either the value of a
 or the initial probability of 50 percent are
 too high. The correlation between the im-
 plied errors and the British pound are posi-
 tive in all cases and relatively large, but the
 correlation with the German DM are essen-
 tially zero or negative.
 Overall, the results assuming that the mar-
 ket learned about the new distribution of
 money demand indicates that the market
 recognized the shift in the fundamental vari-
 able much more slowly. In contrast to the
 known parameter version of learning, this
 slower learning increases the implied under-
 prediction due to the transitory component
 of money demand but reduces that due to
 the permanent component. However, the
 weak correlation between the model and the
 DM forward prediction errors suggests that
 actual learning was more likely based upon
 a prior for 8,A with more information than in
 a diffuse prior.
 20 For instance, given a terminal probability of "Old"
 equal to 0.05 implied an initial probability of a "New"
 money demand distribution of 0.86 in the final quarter
 of 1981.
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 TABLE 3-IMPLIED EXCHANGE RATE FORECAST ERRORS WITH PARAMETER LEARNING EVOLUTION
 AND SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE PROBABILITIES AND THE FORECAST ERRORS
 Ex Post Forecast Bias: e,-P00(,t - 6o,t)+(1 + a)[(P,8o, + P",t,8,)-(P0,t 8O,t-1 + P ,,- 1,,t- )]
 8O: Average - 0.160, Range - 0.26/ - 0.09, Variance 0.003
 8,: Average 0.206, Range - 0.46/1.44, Variance 0.111
 For Initial Probability
 of New Process 0.5 0.01
 PN et PN et
 a=0.8 =12.2 a=0.8 =84.8
 Month
 81:12 0.50 5.33 28.63 0.010 3.38 7.60
 82:01 0.50 -1.41 - 9.90 0.010 -0.24 - 4.23
 82:02 0.11 - 0.35 - 2.10 0.001 -0.12 -1.64
 82:03 0.41 0.33 1.88 0.007 0.19 1.79
 82:04 0.49 0.44 1.52 0.007 0.47 1.88
 82:05 0.07 0.14 -1.59 0.001 0.44 0.33
 82 :06 0.69 - 0.05 0.52 0.021 -0.47 - 2.32
 82:07 0.41 0.76 - 0.36 0.007 1.58 2.29
 82:08 0.16 0.93 1.26 0.002 1.07 2.97
 82:09 0.18 - 0.09 - 0.71 0.030 -0.35 -1.19
 82:10 0.87 0.25 1.35 0.650 0.58 3.29
 82:11 0.25 0.36 1.27 0.003 0.34 2.91
 82:12 0.83 0.64 4.20 0.048 0.50 3.85
 83 :01 0.88 0.03 0.02 0.071 0.31 1.33
 83:02 0.23 - 0.34 - 3.87 0.003 0.20 - 3.37
 83 :03 0.70 0.61 3.47 0.023 0.57 2.47
 83 :04 0.89 0.31 2.03 0.075 0.39 4.40
 83: 05 0.25 - 0.31 - 4.23 0.003 0.32 - 3.51
 83 :06 0.78 0.64 3.89 0.035 0.63 2.81
 83:07 0.84 0.19 0.84 0.051 0.55 1.93
 83 :08 0.17 - 0.27 - 4.29 0.002 0.38 - 2.23
 83 :09 0.65 0.50 2.79 0.018 0.41 1.07
 83:10 0.76 0.21 0.92 0.030 0.43 1.50
 83:11 0.39 0.04 -1.53 0.006 0.47 0.46
 83:12 0.76 0.57 3.23 0.031 0.67 3.05
 84:01 0.72 - 0.01 - 0.80 0.025 0.36 - 0.63
 84:02 0.32 - 0.16 - 2.90 0.005 0.34 - 2.30
 84:03 0.66 0.45 2.25 0.019 0.50 1.61
 84:04 0.71 0.28 1.17 0.024 0.53 2.30
 84:05 0.36 0.05 - 1.84 0.006 0.52 - 0.29
 84:06 0.73 0.46 2.35 0.026 0.58 1.32
 Forward Prediction Errors: Mean Minimum Maximum Variance
 German Deutsche Mark 0.95 - 5.06 7.72 8.05
 British Pound -1.08 - 5.03 6.09 6.56
 Implied Errors: Mean Variance Covariance w/Forward Errors
 German DM British Pound
 a = 0.8/Initial P, of 0.50 -0.34 1.06 -0.04 0.39
 a = 0.8/Initial P,, of 0.01 - 0.50 0.43 - 0.04 0.08
 a= 14/Initial P,, of 0.50 -1.05 44.79 0.00 3.41
 a = 14/Initial P, of 0.01 - 0.57 0.79 - 0.12 0.22
 a-=12.23/Initial P, of 0.50 -0.95a 35.16 0.00 3.01
 a = 84.83/Initial P, of 0.01 - 0.95a 6.93 - 0.52 0.96
 Notes: aThe forecast error estimates use U.S. Ml money supply, CPI, and industrial production data described in Richard
 Meese and Kenneth Rogoff (1984). Interest rates are from Morgan Guaranty's World Finianicial Markets, while exchange rates
 are from the IMF's International Statistics Monthly.
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 IV. Concluding Remarks
 This paper investigated the effects upon
 average dollar forecast errors following the
 increase in U.S. money demand in the early
 1980s as the market was learning about the
 new process of money. For relatively conser-
 vative parameter values, the magnitude of
 under-prediction of the dollar's strength ap-
 peared to correspond to roughly one-half of
 the under-prediction implied by the forward
 exchange rate during the same period. Al-
 though this analysis represents a useful ini-
 tial investigation into the effects of revising
 beliefs about the fundamentals process, a
 noteworthy issue remains. Contrary to the
 implications of this once-and-for-all switch
 in fundamentals with learning, the system-
 atic nature of the prediction errors implied
 by the forward rate in the foreign exchange
 market or by survey data do not appear to
 die out over time. Although the systematic
 nature of forecast errors may appear more
 pronounced over some time intervals, the
 persistence in this behavior over longer peri-
 ods implies that learning about a change in
 fundamentals cannot be the only explana-
 tion. Thus, the apparent systematic behavior
 of prediction errors over longer time periods
 may arise from a combination of learning
 behavior together with anticipations of fu-
 ture policy changes and risk premia.
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